MoviePass is exploring a sale and pitching streaming companies on a $10 monthly theater add-on that would give subscribers one movie ticket per month. A studio-owned streaming service could direct those tickets toward its own theatrical releases, recover part of the admission cost through box-office revenue, and make moviegoing another paid subscription benefit.
An internal sales deck obtained by Adweek projects as much as $1.56 billion in annual profit if 20 million customers purchase the add-on. The calculation assumes that 30% of tickets go unused and that the buyer’s net ticket cost averages $5 after recovering its share of box-office revenue.
MoviePass has held executive-level discussions with several prospective buyers over roughly six weeks. No formal bid has emerged, and the proposed $10 price remains hypothetical.
The pitch offers streaming companies another way to monetize existing subscribers and promote theatrical releases. It also makes ticket redemptions a recurring expense, creating a direct tension between the customer engagement a buyer wants and the margins it hopes to earn.
The Breakage Bet
MoviePass’s model starts with $120 in annual subscription revenue per customer.
When a subscriber uses the benefit for the buyer’s own theatrical release, the studio pays for admission but recovers approximately half the ticket price through its distribution share of box-office revenue. The deck assumes a net ticket cost of $5.
A subscriber who redeems all 12 tickets generates $60 annually after modeled ticket expenses. With 30% of tickets going unused, average annual redemptions fall to 8.4, reducing ticket costs to $42 and leaving $78 per subscriber.
At 20 million members, the model produces $2.4 billion in annual subscription revenue, $840 million in ticket expenses, and $1.56 billion remaining.
That figure represents modeled contribution after assumed ticket costs, not independently verified net profit. The available reporting doesn’t establish which additional expenses, including payment processing, customer support, marketing, and technology operations, are included in the projection.
The $5 average cost is particularly favorable. It reflects the economics of customers seeing the buyer’s own films and assumes those economics can be maintained across redemptions. When subscribers watch another studio’s release, the buyer must finance the admission without recovering distribution revenue.
The 30% breakage assumption also comes from MoviePass’s existing operating history. A product marketed to millions of streaming customers could attract subscribers with substantially different moviegoing habits.
Higher redemption increases fulfillment costs. Persistently low redemption creates another problem: subscribers who stop seeing value in the benefit have another recurring charge to cancel.
The buyer needs enough usage to justify renewals without allowing ticket costs to consume the subscription revenue.
The $168 Million Swing
At 20 million members and 30% breakage, the proposed bundle would finance 168 million theater visits annually.
For scale, that’s equivalent to approximately 22% of the 769.2 million movie tickets sold across U.S. and Canadian theaters in 2025.
The comparison illustrates the volume embedded in MoviePass’s model, rather than a forecast of its share of the domestic market. Those redemptions wouldn’t necessarily represent additional attendance, and the eventual geographic distribution of subscribers remains unknown.
Some customers would use the benefit for films they already intended to see.
At 168 million annual redemptions, every additional $1 in average net ticket cost reduces contribution by $168 million.
A 10-percentage-point decline in breakage, from 30% to 20%, would generate another 24 million redemptions annually. Even at the deck’s favorable $5 net cost, those additional visits would reduce annual contribution by $120 million.
Ticket prices create further exposure.
The Numbers estimated an average theatrical ticket price of $12.27 in the second quarter of 2026, above the roughly $10 admission price implicit in the deck’s $5 net-cost assumption when a studio recovers half the ticket price.
Actual redemption costs would depend on participating theaters, ticket types, and commercial arrangements. The industry average isn’t a guaranteed price for MoviePass transactions, but it demonstrates why the buyer’s ability to negotiate or recover ticket expenses is important.
The deck’s projected $1.56 billion contribution requires the $5 average net cost to hold across all 168 million redemptions. Higher costs during months without the buyer’s own releases would reduce that return, even if subscriber adoption and breakage met expectations.
The Calendar Tax
MoviePass proposes directing subscribers toward the buyer’s own theatrical releases whenever one is available. During months without an eligible release, customers could redeem their ticket for another film.
That structure gives a studio-owned streaming service a direct promotional channel into its existing subscriber base.
Disney could theoretically direct Disney+ customers toward its theatrical slate. Comcast could connect Peacock subscribers with Universal releases. Skydance, which completed its acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery in October, now combines the Paramount and Warner Bros. film operations with a broader streaming business.
None has been publicly identified as a prospective MoviePass buyer.
The economics favor companies with enough theatrical releases to keep ticket redemptions attached to their own films.
When subscribers watch the buyer’s movies, the studio can recover part of the admission expense through distribution revenue. When they watch competitors’ films, the buyer absorbs the ticket cost without that offset.
At a retail ticket price above $10, a single outside-film redemption could exceed that month’s add-on revenue before accounting for any other expenses.
A studio’s release schedule therefore affects the cost of the benefit and its usefulness as theatrical marketing.
The buyer also needs to distinguish incremental attendance from purchases that would’ve occurred anyway.
If someone planned to buy a ticket to the studio’s latest release at full price, the bundle may simply subsidize an existing purchase. The studio retains its distribution share but doesn’t necessarily gain a new moviegoer or meaningful incremental box-office revenue.
Theaters maintain their own advantages. They collect admission revenue, sell concessions, and retain their customer relationships regardless of which streaming company finances the ticket.
The original MoviePass subscription model exposed the danger of subsidizing theatrical demand without controlling enough of the economics surrounding the visit. Its near-unlimited $9.95 plan encouraged frequent attendance while requiring MoviePass to purchase tickets from exhibitors.
The proposed bundle caps usage at one ticket per month and gives a studio buyer a potential offset through distribution revenue.
Consumer choice remains a constraint.
Directing subscribers toward a movie they don’t want to see can reduce redemption expenses while weakening the product’s appeal. Offering broader choice can support retention but increase the cost of fulfilling the benefit.
Theatrical release schedules would become part of the subscription’s pricing and retention economics.
Distribution Is the Asset
MoviePass reportedly has approximately 50,000 paying subscribers and more than $10 million in annual recurring revenue.
Its proposed 20 million-member scenario would require a paying audience 400 times larger.
A major streaming service already has the billing relationships, subscriber data, marketing channels, and customer reach needed to introduce an add-on at that scale.
MoviePass would contribute ticketing infrastructure, theater access, and an established consumer brand.
Its technology includes a card-based system designed to enable ticket purchases at theaters accepting Mastercard without requiring direct integrations with every chain.
The sales deck also proposes licensing that infrastructure to other studio-owned streaming services for $1 per member per month.
That presents two potential acquisition strategies.
A buyer could reserve the theater benefit for its own subscribers, using theatrical access to differentiate its streaming service, support film releases, and reduce cancellations.
Alternatively, it could license MoviePass technology to competing media companies, collecting recurring infrastructure revenue from a broader market.
At the proposed $1 monthly licensing rate, every million licensed members would represent $12 million in annual revenue before expenses. That opportunity wouldn’t necessarily require the infrastructure owner to finance the movie tickets redeemed by another company’s subscribers.
Licensing would also make similar theatrical benefits available to rival streaming services.
A buyer would have to decide whether MoviePass creates more value through an exclusive consumer offering or as ticketing infrastructure sold across the industry.
Those businesses carry different margins, customer acquisition requirements, and competitive consequences.
Profits Need Receipts
A person familiar with MoviePass’s sale process says the company is currently profitable.
Its public financial disclosures establish a more complicated historical picture.
MoviOne, the current MoviePass operator, reported approximately $14.1 million in revenue and a $5.5 million net loss for 2024 in its November 2025 SEC offering statement.
The filing also stated that MoviOne wasn’t yet profitable at the time and outlined a plan to achieve profitability within 12 months.
Those disclosures don’t rule out a subsequent turnaround. Updated financial statements would be necessary to establish current earnings, cash flow, and the costs supporting the newer profitability claim.
The revenue figures also need reconciliation.
MoviOne’s November 2025 investor materials cited $14 million in annual recurring revenue. The person describing the current sale process characterized annual recurring revenue as north of $10 million.
The newer characterization doesn’t provide a precise enough figure to establish whether recurring revenue has increased or declined. The figures may reflect different reporting periods, definitions, or performance. A prospective buyer would need current subscription and revenue records to determine the actual trend.
The distinction between recurring revenue and recognized revenue also needs to remain clear. The company’s $14.1 million in 2024 reported revenue is a historical accounting measure, while annual recurring revenue is a subscription run-rate measure.
No formal offer, agreed valuation, or confirmed buyer has been disclosed.
A person familiar with the process suggested MoviePass could attract a valuation equal to eight to 10 times annual revenue. That remains a potential valuation approach, not an established asking price or buyer offer.
Any acquisition premium would need to be supported by verified financial performance, the commercial value of MoviePass’s ticketing infrastructure, and the incremental revenue or retention a larger distributor could generate.
The Streaming Wars Take
A studio-owned streaming service has three potential sources of return from a theatrical bundle: contribution from the $10 add-on, incremental box-office revenue from its own releases, and streaming subscription revenue preserved through better retention.
MoviePass’s deck models the first. The other two depend on demonstrating that the benefit changes customer behavior.
A subscriber who redeems more tickets may generate less direct contribution while becoming more valuable through additional theatrical spending or a lower likelihood of canceling the underlying streaming service.
The buyer needs to measure those effects together.
The release calendar also changes the economics month by month. Films distributed by the buyer create opportunities to recover ticket costs and support theatrical marketing. Months without eligible releases increase exposure to financing competitors’ movies.
A limited commercial trial could establish actual redemption expenses, incremental theatrical attendance, retention lift, and the share of subsidized tickets replacing purchases customers would’ve made independently.
That evidence would help determine whether a buyer should acquire MoviePass, license its technology, or leave theatrical tickets outside its streaming subscription.
The acquisition case becomes stronger if the bundle can retain subscribers and generate incremental ticket sales that justify the subsidy. If those benefits fail to materialize, the technology may still be worth licensing without assuming the recurring obligation to finance moviegoing.
MoviePass can sell the infrastructure and the projection. A buyer should pay an acquisition premium only for demonstrated earnings, incremental theatrical spending, and streaming customers it can retain profitably.
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